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In the 2013 Asia Lecture, Vinay Gidwani examined through 
stories, images and both conceptual and empirical analysis 
the spatial histories and evolving political economy of 
waste in Delhi, India. Dr. Gidwani focused particularly on the 
marginalized people whose livelihoods depend on gathering, 
sorting, transporting and selling garbage in India’s huge 
informal economy, livelihoods now challenged as the municipal 
government contracts the recycling of waste to corporations. 
For Dr. Gidwani, the evolving, bumpy geography of the 
waste economy creates permanent border areas of primitive 
accumulation and both devalorized and valorized people and 
places, linking the impoverished garbage pickers of Delhi’s 
largest landfills with the city’s glitzy real-estate developments. 
The lecture was drawn from Dr. Gidwani’s project called 
Afterlives of Waste and his chapter in Ecologies of Urbanism in 
India, edited by Anne Rademacher and K. Sivaramakrishnan.
I want to begin with a quote from a wonderful book of stories 
by Italo Calvino called Invisible Cities, where I refer to the 1974 
edition. Those of you who have read my chapter in Ecologies 
of Urbanism in India, edited by Anne Rademacher and K. 
Sivaramakrishnan have seen this quote before. The concept of 
the book is quite simple. Marco Polo is in a conversation with 
the aging emperor Kublai Khan and regaling him with stories 
of all the wonderful, magical cities that he has experienced in 
various outposts of Kublai Khan’s far-flung empire, in a sense 
giving the aging emperor a glimpse into the way his empire 
operates. This particular story is of a city called Leonia, and 
I’ve simply put it up because it echoes so wonderfully well 
the situation that you might want to recount for a city like 
Delhi or a city like Islamabad, or Dhaka or Manila, or Bangkok 
or Cairo or Rio de Janeiro, or Buenos Aires. It doesn’t matter. 
But in some ways this is a faithful rendition of what we might 
confront in a city today. He says:
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[O]n the sidewalks encased in spotless plastic bags, 
the remains of Leonia await the garbage truck not 
only squeezed tubes of toothpaste, blown out light 
bulbs, newspapers, containers, wrappings, but also 
boilers, encyclopedia’s, pianos, porcelain dinner 
services. Nobody wonders where each day they—
which is to say the street cleaners—carry their load 
of refuse. Outside the city, surely, but each year 
the city expands and the street cleaners have to 
fall farther back. The bulk of the outflow increases, 
and the piles rise higher, become stratified, 
extend over a wider perimeter. Besides, the more 
Leonia’s talent for making new materials excels, 
the more the rubbish improves in quality, resists 
time, the elements, fermentations, combustions, 
a fortress of indestructible leftovers surrounds 
Leonia dominating it on every side like a chain of 
mountains.
This gentleman here (see Figure 1) is a municipal worker who 
works on one of Delhi’s largest landfills. He is atop a landfill 
that I visited in Delhi in August of 2013. It’s the highest point 
on the landscape, and in so many ways echoes what Calvino 
was talking about. 
 I want to give the lecture in seven parts. I’m going 
to begin by talking briefly about the work of a late Indian 
Marxist economist, Kalyan Sanyal, and his concept of the 
“need economy” and the way in which it helps us understand 
some of the ongoing transformations in contemporary India. 
I’m also going to talk about a report put out in 2007 by the 
National Commission for Enterprise in the Unorganized Sector, 
NCEUS, better known as the Arjun Sengupta Commission. 
This was a landmark report on the state and contributions of 
India’s informal economy. I’m going to say a little bit about 
the missing geographies of the informal economy, about 
spatial economics and the rhythms that organize particularly 
the economies of waste in cities like Delhi. I’m going to talk 
very briefly about some of the legal rulings that have begun 
to transform urban space and urban rhythms, and the effects 
those have had on the organization of informal economies. I’m 
going to speculate about something that I will call a dialectic of 
waste and value, and finally, I will have a little bit to say about 
what the implications of all this verbosity might be. So let’s 
begin with Sanyal’s concept of the need economy.
 Sanyal, as I mentioned, was an Indian Marxist 
economist who wrote a book back in 2007 called Rethinking 
Capitalist Development, which I recommend reading. It’s quite 
an insightful book. You may disagree with it, but nevertheless 
find it insightful. What Sanyal wants to do in that book, very 
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Figure 1: Municipal worker who 
works on one of Delhi’s largest 
landfills. (Vinay Gidwani 2013) 
simply, is to move away from developmentalist understandings 
of capitalist processes. What he wants to do is think in terms 
of what he calls a “capital-non-capital complex” and the 
manner in which this capital-non-capital complex operates in 
contemporary India. The empirical grist for his work derives 
from some rather startling statistics that have begun to 
emerge in the last 15 years on the makeup of India’s economy.  
 
And what’s startling? The pie chart (see Figure 2) suggests 
that the informal economy accounts for almost 93 per cent of 
employment in India. What Sanyal calls the need economy is 
a large subset of this informal economy. The formal economy, 
or what Sanyal calls the accumulation economy (I’ll get to 
these distinctions momentarily), accounts for about 7 per 
cent of employment in India. That’s pretty startling, although 
let’s be fair, for what’s included here, what’s folded into the 
informal economy is the agricultural sector, which is informal 
to begin with. Even so, even if you subtract the agricultural 
sector, the size of the informal economy is absolutely massive. 
This has profound implications, I think, for the narrative that is 
sometimes told, the kind of celebratory narrative about India’s 
growth miracle, which lately has been punctured, somewhat.
 Let’s return to Sanyal and his concept of the need 
economy. As he construes the need economy, he thinks of 
it as something that is part and parcel of a capitalist social 
formation. He doesn’t see it as something that is divorced 
from capitalist processes. Rather he sees it as a sub-economy 
that is folded into the effect of capitalist transformations 
that are happening, and he uses vivid language to describe 
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Figure 2: Employment in India’s 
Economy (2004-2005)
Source: Pie chart based on data 
from the National Commission for 
Enterprises in the Unorganised 
Sector, Government of India, 2009. 
The Challenge of Employment 
in India: An Informal Economy 
Perspective, Volume I – Main 
Report. New Delhi: Academic 
Foundation.
the need economy. He calls it the space of the dispossessed, 
comprising those who are excluded from the space of 
capital, a wasteland created by capitalist development. He 
says the inhabitants of this need economy are victims of 
primitive accumulation, of capitalist processes, occurring in 
heterogeneous locations. The space of the dispossessed is 
not an empty space. The inhabitants engage in a number of 
activities for their survival; and these activities, heterogeneous 
in makeup, comprise a sub-economy. But the point to be 
stressed is that the sub-economy is the result of exclusion.
 Now some of these claims may be familiar to those 
of you who study various parts of the world. They have long 
antecedents. One of the works of scholarship that Sanyal 
draws on is an article that some of you have likely read, by 
José Nun called, “The End of Work and the ‘Marginal Mass’ 
Thesis,” published in 2000 in Latin American Perspectives. 
There, Nun claims that in many places a surplus population 
is growing, that in the best of cases is simply irrelevant to the 
hegemonic capitalist sector of the economy and in the worst 
cases endangers its stability.
 So, it’s an economic problem, but it’s also a political 
problem because the growth of this apparently non-functional, 
and I underscore “apparently” non-functional, surplus 
population appears to indicate the impossibility of transition 
narratives that we are now so familiar with, specifically the 
transition from traditional to a modern mode of production 
that was the bread and butter of dual economy models in 
development economics all the way into the 1970s. Variations 
of it continue to linger. Sanyal takes the work of folks like José 
Nun, but also earlier scholars like the economic anthropologist 
Keith Hart from the 1970s and Harold Wolpe from South 
Africa, to build a conceptual model of this capital-non-capital 
complex. The model can be schematically depicted as follows, 
as I have distilled from his book. There are heterogeneous 
processes of primitive accumulation, of uneven development, 
in rural areas as well as in urban fringes. These lead to mass 
migration to cities. In cities, migrants are unable to find formal 
sector jobs. They have to survive, and they survive by finding 
livelihoods in all sorts of urban niches. These urban niches are 
lumped together under the rubric “informal sector,” or more 
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recently “informal economy”.
 Now the term informal economy itself is an old one. 
It goes back to the work of Keith Hart and others from the 
1970s. But Sanyal’s point is that the informal economy has 
become newly visible, which is to say, no longer as part of 
a transition narrative. Rather, there is an uneasy, ongoing 
recognition that the informal economy is in fact here to stay. 
It’s a permanent fixture of the economical landscape: it’s not 
going away. Sanyal wants to argue, as do other scholars, that 
the informal economy in fact should give us pause because 
maybe what’s at stake here is a completely different story that 
has to be told about capitalist development in countries like 
India over the last 50 to 60 years, an account that re-imagines 
the status, the contributions, and the work of the informal 
economy. This informal economy, it won’t surprise you, is 
then recognized as a governmental problem that has to be 
dealt with. Here we come to a happy union between people 
you likely know, which is Sanyal whom I’ve just introduced, 
but also the work of Partha Chatterjee, particularly his 2004 
book The Politics of the Governed. I’ll say a bit more about 
the convergence between Chatterjee and Sanyal, but first let 
me just summarize how Sanyal pronounces the death of dual 
economy models.
 He says, look, when we look back at the last five 
decades of post-independence India, we see three phases of 
hegemony. The first phase is what he calls a moment of simple 
hegemony, where the truth of dual-economy models, many 
of them derived from the Indian experience, rules. The Delhi 
School of Economics, which was founded in 1949-1950, was 
a thriving site for economists from all over the world. It was 
India’s empirical experience, but also the kind of normative 
trajectory that was envisioned for India that became the 
grist for many of the insights that development economics 
emerged with in the 1950s and the 1960s, where it was able 
to consolidate itself as this subfield within the discipline. 
But at that moment the dominant narrative was one of a 
transition, from the traditional to the modern sector, where 
the primacy of the modern sector, which was conflated with 
the industrialized urban sector, was simply taken for granted. 
Not surprisingly, we’ve seen this become a kind of staple of 
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modernization narratives, not just in economics through dual 
economy models, but also in modernization narratives in 
sociology, in political science, and many other social science 
disciplines. So this was a moment of simple hegemony where 
the primacy of the model was simply taken for granted, 
commonsensical. However, in the 1970s something changed, 
and this change, according to Sanyal—but also many others 
have observed this—was that poverty suddenly, or perhaps 
not so suddenly, emerges as an object of management, a 
political problem that has to be dealt with in order to sustain a 
certain desired growth trajectory. 
 Sanyal dates the moment of transition, which seems 
a bit disingenuous, but he identifies the speech that Robert 
McNamara gave in 1973 in Lagos, where he talked about how 
the World Bank had to begin addressing questions of poverty. 
So poverty now becomes a political problem that has to be 
confronted, and the state is now entrusted with the role of 
managing poverty and reversing the effects of the primitive 
accumulation that is producing this poverty. So in a sense, the 
state becomes a more actively Keynesian state, if you will. This 
is the second moment of hegemony, a complex hegemony 
as Sanyal puts it. Then, finally he says that at the turn of the 
millennium, we go through yet another transition where the 
informal now is understood as something that is permanent, 
something that needs to be governed, an arena with latent 
entrepreneurial capacities that need to be unleashed. You’ve 
probably read all the accounts that have been produced by 
business gurus who talk about the entrepreneurial capacities 
and consumption power of the bottom billion that are 
just waiting to be unleashed. That’s the third moment of 
hegemony. Sanyal here is in happy congruence with Partha 
Chatterjee, and it’s not a surprise, because Sanyal and Partha 
Chatterjee have been having an underground conversation, 
from what I gather, for about two decades. So, Chatterjee’s 
work has been influenced by Sanyal and vice versa. But Sanyal, 
as I mentioned, is conceptualizing the contemporary social 
formation in countries like India as a capital-non-capital-
complex that consists of a need economy, a space of non-
capitalist production that is outside capitalist production but 
within the social formation of capitalism. It is an outside that 
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is actually inside, which is to say something that is folded 
into, and is the effect of, the workings of the accumulation 
economy. Moreover, this inside, that is, the outside that is 
inside (for those of you that are familiar with the agrarian 
studies literature) has some resemblance to A.V. Chayanov’s 
work in The Theory of Peasant Economy (1966). Specifically, 
the conceptual distinction that Sanyal enacts between the 
need economy and the accumulation economy is as follows: 
the accumulation economy is the profit-oriented economy, 
the need economy is the need-oriented economy, but is 
undergirded by a subsistence, safety-first logic, a livelihood 
logic of survival. It’s not that there isn’t any surplus generation 
in the need economy, but the overriding emphasis is on the 
generation of livelihoods. This has some profound political 
implications for Sanyal because in many of these forms of 
livelihood that inhabit the need economy, the traditional 
relations of antagonism between workers and employers 
becomes attenuated. This, for Sanyal, opens up a problem for 
political imagination and organizing. I’ll get to that later.
Now, what Sanyal identifies as the inhabitants of the need 
economy, Partha Chatterjee identifies as the inhabitants of 
political society. So, very briefly then, Chatterjee, as many 
of you know, enacts a distinction between what he calls 
civil society and political society. In countries like India, he 
says, civil society is the space of formal citizenship which is 
substantively available only to a subset of the population, the 
middle class, the bourgeoisie. The need economy consists of 
the urban poor, a vast and heterogeneous population who 
are nominally citizens, but who don’t really have the same 
capacity to exert the substantive rights of citizenship unless 
they find ways of coalescing into communities with some 
moral charge, some moral standing, that makes them visible 
to the state, where the state cannot afford to ignore them 
anymore. It’s this moral standing, in the form of community, 
that allows these populations to lay claim to the resources 
of the state. In his 2011 book Lineages of Political Society, 
Chatterjee explicitly acknowledges his debt to Sanyal and 
says that political society is the space of management of 
non-corporate capital, as contrasted to the accumulation 
economy which is the space of corporate capital. Now we can 
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quarrel about this distinction that Chatterjee draws, but what 
I want to point out here is simply that there is a convergence 
between Sanyal and Chatterjee, and it’s not a coincidental 
one. Let me then say something about the Arjun Sengupta 
Commission and why it’s significant because in many ways 
it provides what we might call the empirical warrant for the 
conceptual renovations that someone like Sanyal engages in. 
The Commission doesn’t use the term need economy by the 
way, it uses the term informal or unorganized economy. 
 Page one of that report points out that by the end of 
2004-2005 about 836 million people, or about 77% of India’s 
population, were living below 20 rupees a day (US $0.40) 
and constituted the bulk of India’s informal economy. 79% of 
this group, of these 836 million, belonged to the informal, or 
unorganized sector, which is to say that they were working 
without any legal protection for their jobs, without any social 
security, living in abject poverty. The report remarks with 
savage brio, “excluded from all the glory of shining India.” I 
say with savage brio because this was a commission that was 
appointed by the Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, 
who you can imagine was none too happy when he finally 
was given the recommendation of the report. I met one of the 
people appointed to the Sengupta Commission, an economist 
at the Center for Development Studies in Trivandrum. He 
pointed out that when they presented the findings of the 
report, Manmohan Singh was distinctly irritated and told them 
that this was not what he had charged them to do. 
 The report basically came out and said that the 
government of India should enact a social security bill, which 
would provide a strong social safety net to workers in the 
unorganized economy. Manmohan Singh came back and 
said, look, I asked you to tell me what sort of policies we can 
enact to unleash the entrepreneurial energies of the informal 
sector. There was a social security bill that was enacted by 
the government of India in December 2008. One of the main 
pillars of that bill was something called the Rashtriya Swasthya 
Bima Yojana (RSBY), a national health insurance scheme, 
which was roundly debated and criticized by Indian activists 
and scholars. Nevertheless, the RSBY was a momentous policy 
decision. Equally significant, the Sengupta Commission, and 
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the NCEUS, a government appointed body, were disbanded. 
They no longer exist. So if you want to look for reports on what 
is fresh about the informal economy in India, you’re out of 
luck. Or you actually have to go to the National Sample Survey 
Organization, the NSS, which has been conducting economic 
surveys of various aspects of India’s economy for the longest 
time. In the 55th round of the NSS, that is 1999-2000, they 
explicitly started to ask questions in the survey about the 
informal economy. In Figure 3, which is based on data from 
that 55th round and the 61st round in 2004-2005, the totals in 
red are significant. 
 
They compiled data that not only identified the number 
of workers in unregulated enterprises, which we would 
conventionally recognize as part of the informal economy, 
but also workers in formal sectors of the economy that had 
been informalized, something that we see happening in North 
America when salary work becomes contract work. What they 
discovered is this: in this six year period (1999 to 2000 to 2004 
to 2005) there was almost no net employment creation in the 
formal sector. Remember, these were the heydays of India’s 
growth miracle. Yet, the informal sector is where all the jobs 
are being created. So now you can see that there is a certain 
kind of empirical warrant for the conceptual renovations that 
Sanyal wants to propose. What’s interesting, although I don’t 
know if it’s coincidental, is that Sanyal’s book was published in 
2007 and the Sengupta Commission report was also released 
in 2007. It comes to a damning conclusion that I’m not going 
to rehearse here, although the sad reality is evident in Figure 
3. The formal economy at the height of India’s growth miracle 
10
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Figure 3: Relationship between 
Sector and Type of Employment, 
All Workers 1999-2000 & 2004-
2005
Source : Computed from the 
Ministry of Statistics  and 
Programme Implementation 
(India). India National Sample 
Survey, 55th Round, 1999-2000 
and 61st Round, 2004-2005. New 
Delhi, India: Ministry of Statistics 
and Programme Implementation 
(India); National Commission for 
Enterprises in the Unorganised 
Sector, Government of India. 2009. 
The Challenge of Employment 
in India: An Informal Economy 
Perspective, Volume I – Main 
Report . New Delhi: Academic 
Foundation, 13, Table 2.3.
wasn’t really creating much employment. So what is the 
nature of this growth miracle? It really does beg the question. 
Now, Sanyal’s book really didn’t get much traction in the West, 
but certainly in Indian scholarship it received a lot of notice 
and was hotly debated. One of the criticisms of his conceptual 
framework was that what he called the need economy and the 
accumulation economy are not as hermetically sealed from 
each other as he made out. Not surprising, similar criticism is 
issued against Chatterjee for suggesting that civil society and 
political society are somehow these two separate domains 
that are neatly separable. Not so. Anybody who has studied 
informal economies knows that in fact the informal and the 
formal are thickly interwoven with each other, there’s a lot of 
interdigitation. You can think of just about any sector within 
the formal economy and you could probably come up with a 
cognate in the informal economy that sustains, supports, and 
underwrites that formal sector. The trite example that I always 
give is that if you go and buy a cake in a high-end bakery in 
Mumbai, the cake was probably produced in a slum, in an 
informal enterprise. High fashion is similar. Where do you think 
the fabric was stitched together or assembled? In the homes 
of the poor, or in sweatshops. Who do you think sifted the 
cement, and where? Our waste, plastic bags, the ubiquitous 
plastic bags, how do you think the plastic was recycled that led 
to the plastic bag? 
 So all I’m saying is a somewhat commonsensical 
point, which is that the informal economy is diverse, it’s 
heterogeneous. To use a singular term like informal economy 
sometimes obscures that, and that’s consequential. But I’m 
also saying that the formal and the informal are so entangled, 
so deeply entangled, that really what we need is an entirely 
different account of what has happened in a place like India in 
the last 50 years. I’m just going to show you some slides of the 
particular case that I’m utilizing to anchor this talk, which is 
of these urban informal economies that are organized around 
different streams of waste. This is the second of Delhi’s three 
large landfills (see Figure 4). Earlier I showed you a photograph 
of the first. This is the Ghazipur landfill, the largest of the 
three, which rises about 500 feet. It’s the highest point in the 
area. We went and spoke to some landfill workers and 
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should point out that a lot of this work that I’ve been doing on 
informal waste economies is in conjunction with an advocacy 
group in Delhi that has been working on this for much longer 
than I have, an organization called Chintan Environmental 
Research and Action Group. Our interviews with landfill 
workers at Ghazipur told us that this was actually a hollow 
depression about 50 feet below the surrounding area when it 
was first started in 1984, which has grown to 500 feet above in 
the intervening years. This landfill, like many other segments 
of the city, supports a livelihood ecology. You can think of it as 
a kind of small urban ecosystem.
 It’s common to observe children who are pickers on 
these landfills. I could share stories with you about how they 
also find half-eaten food and use that to supplement their 
diet, but that would be just pornographic. This is the basic 
structure of waste economies. I want to emphasize that 
these waste economies are quite heterogeneous. They have 
a basic pyramidal structure that you are likely to find in many 
segments of the informal economy. At the base you have 
a large army of waste pickers; in a city like Delhi there are 
150,000 to 200,000, but nobody really has an accurate census. 
You have a number of petty scrap dealers, many of them risen 
from the ranks of the waste pickers through toil, through luck, 
through scrounging, through loans, through help from social 
networks and so on, often through violence. Then you have 
the bigger players, who are the warehouse owners, who have 
storage space, which gives them the capacity to enter into 
patron-client relations with petty dealers. The warehouse 
owners in turn sell the waste that they gather to factories 
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Figure 4: Ghazipur landfill, Delhi’s 
largest municipal dumpsite, an 
urban commons that supports 
a diverse community of waste 
pickers (Mayank Bhatnagar, 2008, 
with permission)
and re-processors, who then hurl it back into what we would 
call the accumulation economy, the circuits of capitalist 
value. Again, this is not surprising. This is also a typical 
spatial value chain of waste and because waste economies 
are heterogeneous the architecture of e-waste is likely to be 
spatially quite different from the architecture of municipal 
waste, or of plastics, of glass, of scrap metal, of fabric, of 
hair. In fact, some waste pickers say that there are almost 
150 different streams of waste, each with their own spatial 
organization, each with their own value chain differentially 
stretched in space.
 With most informal economies, the architecture is 
closely anchored to the place of habitation. Imagine you’re 
a waste picker. You have a gunny sack, a jute or plastic bag, 
which you carry on your back, or if you’re lucky maybe a 
cycle with a cart on the back. This imposes certain physical 
limitations on the catchment area that you can traverse. If 
you’re walking around maybe you can walk about 10 km a day 
and that becomes in your radius, or maybe 5km. If you have 
a bicycle maybe your radius increases, and the catchment 
area also multiplies. There’s a designated territory or route. 
This has been painstakingly established through informal 
conventions and negotiations and often brawling. It is policed, 
both individually and also through peer pressure. Then once 
you’ve gathered the waste you need a place to segregate 
it; you need to sort it. That’s not as easy as it sounds, 
especially in cities like Delhi where property values have been 
absolutely skyrocketing; parts of Delhi are more expensive 
than Manhattan. It’s not that easy to find areas where you 
can dump the garbage that you’ve collected so that you can 
sort through it, because residents get wild. Then you need a 
place to store it. Most people don’t have that, because most 
of them are living in shanties which are very thickly scrunched 
together. These are very high-density slums. Basically, and 
this again is something that should be familiar to people who 
are invested in the agrarian studies literature, you pretty 
much have to sell right away, which means that it lowers your 
bargaining leverage. You have to sell so that you can get cash 
in hand so that you can meet your daily livelihood needs. 
The petty scrap dealer has the advantage of having a place to 
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store. Then you have the warehouse owner who is higher up 
on the food chain and finally the re-processor. So the spatial 
economics, what we might call the tricks of the trade, are 
pretty straightforward. In this strange magical world of waste, 
purity matters. So how finely you’re able to sort different 
categories of waste determines what you’re able to command 
from the scrap dealer if you’re a waste picker, or from the 
warehouse owner if you’re a scrap dealer.
 
 Volume also matters, because there are scale 
economies in transportation. If you’re able to gather 
up sufficient quantities of waste, which can all then be 
transported in one go in an overloaded truck, then the 
warehouse owner is likely to give you a better price. Timing 
also matters, and here’s where the capacity to store becomes 
so critical, because if you can’t store you have to sell at the 
reigning price. If you can store, you can play the market, 
because the market also fluctuates, the price fluctuates. Until 
recently the country that has been exerting this giant sucking 
sound is China: China is the biggest consumer of scrap, of 
cardboard, of metals, of plastics, of glass, of e-waste and so 
on. So, what happens in China has ripple effects in Delhi. This 
is an example of how, if you have a simple technology like a 
cart that you can join to your cycle, then it suddenly increases 
both the catchment area and the volume that you are able 
to gather. This is what an empty cart looks like (see Figure 
5). These are waste pickers who are sorting their wares on a 
waterlogged tract near the banks of the Yamuna River that 
flows through Delhi, because it’s so hard to find a place to sort 
(see Figure 6). This is the humble shop of a scrap dealer, 
Asia Colloquia Papers Vol. 04 No. 02 // 2014
14
Figure 5: An empty cycle cart 
(Mayank Bhatnagar, 2008, with 
permission)
basically a sort of dimly lit one room affair in most instances 
so it’s not much to speak of (see Figure 7). Most of what he 
stores is spilling out onto the pavement, and he’s obviously 
engaged in some negotiations with the local beat cops, paying 
them off on the side to let him do that. This is a warehouse 
owner in Old Delhi who is using an adjacent alley as a public 
space for assorted items (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 6: Pickers sorting and 
amassing their wares (maal) 
(Mayank Bhatnagar, 2008, with 
permission)
Figure 7: A typical scrap dealer’s 
(kabari’s) shop, a humble one room 
affair with wares spilling onto the 
street (Mayank Bhatnagar, 2008, 
with permission)
Figure 8: Alley warehouse, Old 
Delhi (Mayank Bhatnagar, 2008, 
with permission)
This is a squatter settlement that also doubles up as a storage 
space (see Figure 9). Scrap metal, plastics, auto trash, scrap 
paper, even old doors are just a few of the streams of waste 
that make up this waste economy.
 
I’m not going to spend much time talking about judicial 
activism in Delhi that has been quite consequential particularly 
in the past 15 years in transforming the spatial economics 
of these informal economies around waste. However, it is 
notable that the various judicial decisions that have been 
handed down in the past 15 years have had an enormous 
impact on the viability of many of these informal economies. 
They include decisions that have essentially opened up the 
recycling of waste to corporate entities so the municipal 
governments of cities like Delhi have now started contracting 
waste management to corporations, with profound effects on 
these waste economies. It’s an era of judicial activism that the 
legal scholar Usha Ramanathan has described as a scenario 
where what was once informal has now become illegal.
 This really is quite consequential. In fact, if you think 
about this conceptually, what has been happening could 
be described as a chronopolitics, which is to say a politics 
of time where the time of some is devalued and the time 
of others is valued. It has completely altered the temporal 
rhythms of these heterogeneous informal economies. In 
the case of waste, it has led to the corporate privatization 
of waste collection, the closure of scrap dealerships in many 
parts of the cities, through various kinds of municipal drives, 
the demolition of slums which has expelled slum dwellers 
to areas which are sometimes 20 to 30, even 40 kilometers 
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Figure 9: Squatter settlement that 
doubles up as storage (Mayank 
Bhatnagar, 2008, with permission)
away from the city, making it unviable to engage in the same 
form of livelihood that they have so painstakingly assembled. 
There have also been new municipal ordinances, which don’t 
necessarily have the force of law but are enacted on an ad-hoc 
basis by municipal corporations and, nevertheless, intervene 
in and interrupt the workings of these informal economies. 
The infamous Yamun Pushta eviction of 2004, poignantly 
documented by Ruzbeh Bharucha in his film (and book by the 
same name) Yamuna Gently Weeps, led to the displacement of 
about 350,000 residents in the city of Delhi. It involved a slum 
on the banks of the river Yamuna. The eviction was issued on 
two legal grounds: the first was that the slum dwellers were 
polluting the river, the second that they were in a flood-prone 
zone. They were relocated to several places, including a place 
called Bawana, which is roughly 30 kilometers from Delhi with 
poor transportation, making it very difficult if you’re a waste 
picker to come into Delhi and do your business, do your job. 
But, in a brazen display of chronopolitics, on that same zone 
that was labeled flood-prone a temple was allowed to go 
ahead, financed by the Indian diaspora of the Swaminarayans 
(see Figure 10). 
So let me get to the speculative part of my lecture. I want to 
pick on the comment and observation that Walter Benjamin 
makes in his notebooks for The Arcades Project, where he puts 
forward what he calls a modest methodological proposal for a 
cultural historical dialectic as a method of study. This cultural-
historical dialectic, he says, is anchored around re-imagining, 
re-signifying the work of the negative. Briefly, Benjamin says it 
is very easy to establish oppositions according to determinant 
points of view within the various fields of any epoch.
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Figure 10: Akshardham Temple 
(inaugurated in 2005)
Source: Airpano Project, 360° 
Aerial Panorama, 3D Virtual Tours 
Around the World. http://www.
airpano.ru/files/Akshardham-
India/2-2. Photo reproduced from 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Akshardham_Airpano_
wide_view.png  Accessed August 
15, 2014.
For information on the book 
and video, see http://www.
yamunagentlyweeps.com/
Drawing from Benjamin, on one side lies the productive, the 
forward looking, the lively, the positive part of the epoch, the 
modern economy, the formal sector, profit-oriented enterprise 
and hosts of other phenomena besides. On the other side 
lies the abortive, the retrograde and the obsolete. You can 
already see at work in Benjamin’s imagination a notion of 
chronopolitics. The very contours of the positive element will 
appear distinctly only insofar as this negative element is set 
up—this positive set up against the negative. On the other 
hand, every negation has its value solely as background for 
the delineation of what is lively, the positive. It is therefore 
of decisive importance that a new partition be applied to 
this initially excluded negative component so that a positive 
element emerges anew in it, something different from that 
previously signified.
 Here I enter the realm of fantastical speculation. 
Maybe one way to imagine Benjamin’s call for a cultural-
historical dialectic is to think about the travels, the afterlives 
if you will, of waste and how waste has the potential to 
provide what we might call a shadow theory of value. It’s 
something that constantly shadows or haunts projects of 
value, which are continuously reinvented in various epochs. 
We could start from the Great Charter of the Forest in 1225, 
which is part and parcel of the Magna Carta, where, as Peter 
Linebaugh points out in his book The Magna Carta Manifesto, 
the rights of commoners and commoning are most vividly 
asserted. We could go to John Locke’s Second Treatise of 
Government, where the figure of waste comes to mark the 
horizon of political society. We could think about how the 
Lockean renovation of philosophy and politics becomes the 
basis for bourgeois classical political economy, but also how it 
finds its way into various land settlements that were enacted 
in the 19th century in countries like India, but not just India. 
We could think about how this figure of waste enters the 
Fabian socialism of statesmen like Nehru as part and parcel 
of Nehruvian socialist planning. We could think about how 
this figure of waste is then reinvented as part of India’s new 
economic policy, what kind of background work it does in 
giving warrant to projects of value. As I point out here in this 
very early state of thinking, really quite incipient, is that one 
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could think about waste as something that is simultaneously 
concept and matter, something that is figurative and literal, 
that is enrolled at various points. It’s enrolled at the moment 
of appropriation when certain people, places and things 
are recruited into capital circuits of value, in the moment of 
production when that production process generates leakage, 
chaff, entropy and wasted bodies, but also in the moment 
of consumption, when exchange value returns as used value 
and produces in its wake matter that is unusable and, in some 
cases, reusable.
 This could become, perhaps, an entry point into the 
cultural-historical dialectic that someone like Benjamin is 
calling for. As J. M. Neeson, the historian (and student of E. 
P. Thompson) points out, waste in English history was always 
seen as an enemy to be engaged and beaten. So waste 
provides, as I said, perhaps a shadow theory of value. This 
is to say it reveals how capitalist value is always enmeshed 
in struggles that involve a border politics and, I would also 
say, value struggles because I want to maintain, claim, assert 
that capitalist value is only one normative way in which the 
social comes to be organized. There are also other normative 
value forms that can provide the basis for mobilizing, and 
social organization. So I wanted to put it in its place without 
diminishing its profound and pivotal influence. We need to ask 
if value struggles involve a border politics, what gets set on 
the side of waste and what gets valorized as value? How does 
this happen, with what implications, for whom? This shifting, 
uneven geography then produces continuously frontier areas 
for primitive accumulation conjoined more recently with 
this idiom of informality that produces in cities like Delhi a 
patchwork of devalorized and valorized people and places, 
which in turn then gives sanction to various projects of value 
all the way from real-estate development to gentrification, to 
urban reform and so on.
 This brings me to the last segment of my talk, which 
concerns what is to be done. I want to bring it back to 
Calvino, who points out in the story of Leonia with which I 
began that, in fact, the street cleaners of Leonia are treated 
like angels by the inhabitants of Leonia. They pay respect 
to the work of these street cleaners in silence, like a ritual 
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that inspires devotion, which is very unlike how the valued 
inhabitants of Delhi treat their street cleaners. This leads 
me to ask, what could be done concretely in terms of these 
urban informal economies of waste? A lot of groups that have 
been advocating for informal economy workers have pointed 
out that there is a process of sequestration and mobility 
that is crucial in these informal economies. In waste picking, 
people need a place to store and segregate their waste. They 
need security of housing because waste picking is so closely 
anchored to place of habitation. They need provisions for 
mobility, they need right of first access to the city’s municipal 
waste rather than being shunted aside as the waste is given 
away to corporate privatizers who now happily trumpet the 
paradigm that waste is wealth. They need guarantees of non-
harassment from beat cops, from the low level municipal staff. 
They need systems of extended producer responsibility that 
ensure that packaging materials are recyclable and non-toxic. 
They need access to subsidized health care and social safety 
nets as well as incentives for children’s education because 
almost no waste picker wants their children to become waste 
pickers. Conceptually, riffing on the work of Sanyal, Benjamin 
and others, we need the things that radical scholars have 
been doing for some time—counter-narratives of capitalist 
social formations and of development that recast the work 
of the negative, in the case of India the contributions of the 
informal economy. How does that change how we think 
about India’s growth miracle? It exposes the violence and the 
effacements of dominant projects of value-making, particularly 
capitalist value, at different moments. It underscores the 
post-colonial nostrum, the imperative to politicize relations 
of difference, to denaturalize them and in the process show 
how representations of people, places, things and conducts 
are invariably entangled in bio-cultural, racially inflected 
logics that set up an ideal figure of the human, of the citizen. 
We need a form of historical materialism—this is Benjamin’s 
call—that annihilates, that evacuates all traces of progress, 
that is not tempered by developmentalist narratives that then 
become authorizing in all sorts of pernicious ways. Finally, we 
need new idioms of organizing and new forms of solidarity 
that harness among other things the unsettling potential of 
competitive populism that is enabled by electoral politics.
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